

# THE DEMISE OF THE INF TREATY AND INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY

Annotated Bibliography

July 23-24, 2019

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**Center for Global Security Research**  
LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

## **Annotated Bibliography**

### **The Demise of the INF Treaty and Indo-Pacific Security**

Center for Global Security Research  
Livermore, California, July 23-24, 2019

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#### **Key Questions:**

- What impact will the demise of the INF Treaty have on the Indo-Pacific security environment?
- What new forms of competition and cooperation are likely to result?
- What should the United States and its allies do?
- What objectives should guide their actions?

#### **Panel Topics:**

1. The Current Context
2. The Potential Values of Intermediate-range Missiles for U.S. and Allied Security
3. The Potential Costs and Risks of Different Courses of Action
4. Potential Reactions in the Region to Different U.S. & Allied Courses of Action
5. The Future of “Dual Track”
6. Alternative Courses of Action for the United States and Its Allies

## **Panel 1: The Current Context**

- How has the Trump administration defined the pathway forward?
- How have stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific reacted?
- What is the status of IRBM development and deployment in the region?

### **Selected statements of the Trump administration related to the INF Treaty:**

U.S. Department of State. “Press Availability at NATO Headquarters.” Press Conference by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, December 4, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/press-availability-at-nato-headquarters/>.

U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Russia. “APNSA John Bolton Interview with Elena Chernenko, Kommersant.” Unofficial Transcript, October 22, 2018. <https://ru.usembassy.gov/apnsa-john-bolton-interview-with-kommersant/>.

### **Official Japanese reaction:**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “The United States’ Indication that It Will Withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.” Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Kono, October 23, 2018. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e\\_000562.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000562.html).

### **Chinese reactions:**

Liu, Xiaoming. “The US’s Wrong-Headed Decision to Pull Out of the Nuclear Arms Treaty.” *Financial Times*, May 5, 2019. <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/ambassador/t1660956.htm>.

Liu, China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, argues that the demise of the INF Treaty threatens international security and strategic stability. While positing that Chinese intermediate-range missiles serve purely defensive purposes, he asserts that forthcoming U.S. deployments in the Western Pacific illustrate the United States’ expansionist agenda.

Shen, Dingli. “Why US Intends to Renegotiate INF Treaty.” *Global Times*, May 9, 2019. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1149228.shtml>.

Shen, a professor at Fudan University, argues that China’s intermediate-range missiles have made the Taiwan Strait and the larger Western Pacific region more secure and stable. He maintains that the missiles do not have the range, nor are they deployed, such that they threaten the U.S. or Russian homelands. Thus, the United States insistence that China be included in a new INF Treaty is not founded in a legitimate attempt at improving international security and stability. Rather, the United States seeks to gain strategic advantage through treaty negotiations.

## **On the status of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) development and deployment in the region:**

U.S. Department of Defense. 2019 *Missile Defense Review*. <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF>.

The 2019 Missile Defense Review describes the evolving missile-threat landscape the United States and its allies face and outlines the countermeasures envisioned by the Trump administration. Themes include the current threat environment (pp. 5-22) and U.S.-allied cooperation and interoperability (pp. 65-78).

Heginbotham, Eric et al. *The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR392.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html).

RAND's U.S.-China Military Scorecard, Scorecard 1 (pp. 45-68) details the expansion and improvement of China's arsenal of intermediate-range missiles (DF-16, DF-21C, and DF-26) since 1996, with estimates of developments into 2017. Using scenarios of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and on the Spratly Islands, the report gauges the effectiveness of this new fleet of missiles in denying the United States air superiority. The report finds that through its ability to threaten the United States' two major air force bases in the region—Kadena AB in Japan and Andersen AFB in Guam—China can create an air advantage or approximate parity in the two scenarios.

## **Panel 2: The Potential Values of Intermediate-range Missiles for U.S. and Allied Security**

- What can these capabilities contribute to countering China's A2/AD strategies?
- What can they contribute to deterrence of escalation by the DPRK?
- What can they contribute to assurance of allies?
- Do the answers depend on distinctions between different types of systems (cruise versus ballistic, conventional versus nuclear, U.S. versus allied, etc.)?
- What new forms of cooperation are possible to realize these gains?

Bonds, Timothy M., Joel B. Predd, Timothy R. Heath, Michael S. Chase, Michael Johnson, Michael J. Lostumbo, James Bonomo, Muharrem Mane, and Paul S. Steinberg. *What Role Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain Anti-Access/Area Denial Forces Play in Deterring or Defeating Aggression?* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1820.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1820.html).

Bonds et al. analyze the advantages of fielding land-based anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in key regions in order to impose challenges upon adversary A2/AD strategies. They recommend that High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) batteries be deployed to regions in which the United States and its allies (here in particular Japan and Poland) are concerned about the A2/AD capabilities of peer or near-peer

adversaries. Additionally, they propose that the U.S. Army further its research into updating HIMARS to carry surface-to-surface, anti-ship, and anti-cruise missile technology such that these systems can provide multi-domain contestation of adversary A2/AD capabilities. Finally, the authors suggest the Army should work with key allies and partners to build combined concepts and tactics, techniques, and procedures to shift defensive responsibilities.

Colby, Elbridge. "The INF Treaty Hamstrings the U.S. Trump Is Right to Leave It." *Washington Post*, October 23, 2018. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/23/the-inf-treaty-hamstrings-the-u-s-trump-is-right-to-leave-it/?hpid=hp\\_hp-top-table-main-trump-trade%3Ainf-treaty%3Ahomepage%2Ft-colby&utm\\_term=.4c0ba91c6470](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/23/the-inf-treaty-hamstrings-the-u-s-trump-is-right-to-leave-it/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main-trump-trade%3Ainf-treaty%3Ahomepage%2Ft-colby&utm_term=.4c0ba91c6470)

Colby argues that the United States no longer benefits from complying with the INF Treaty. Instead, it should deploy land-based, intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles to East Asia to improve the regional military balance. This would provide the United States and its allies with the ability to draw on a larger, more diverse and resilient strike capability in the Western Pacific.

Denmark, Abraham, and Eric Sayers. "Exiting the Russia Nuclear Treaty Impacts Military Strategy in Asia." *The Hill*, October 25, 2018. <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/413183-exiting-the-russia-nuclear-treaty-impacts-military-strategy-in-asia>.

Denmark and Sayers posit that leaving the INF Treaty would offer the United States the opportunity to adjust its military posture in the Asia Pacific region. Geographical constraints there have forced the United States to rely solely on expensive air and sea platforms to project power. The authors contend that intermediate-range missiles would allow the United States to project power more efficiently and that new land-based systems should be mobile and rapidly deployable, in order to accommodate reluctant allies concerned by permanently based U.S. missiles. Instead, these systems would be based in Guam or Alaska and only deployed forward in a crisis or for joint exercises.

Sayers, Eric, and Sugio Takahashi. "America and Japan in a Post-INF World." *War on the Rocks*, March 8, 2019. <https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/america-and-japan-in-a-post-inf-world/>.

Sayers and Takahashi explore how the U.S.-Japan alliance could strengthen its military posture in a post-INF world. They note that Washington and Tokyo could quickly capitalize on Japan's experience with surface-to-ship missiles by procuring a surface-to-ship cruise missile with a range of 500-1000 km. In the medium term, the allies should work to develop land-attack cruise missiles with a range of 1000-1500 km to offset the current strike gap between Chinese ground-based missiles and U.S. air- and sea-launched capabilities. Finally, they posit that since the strike gap presents an immediate threat to the Japanese homeland rather than the continental United States, Japan should drive discussions and suggest how the alliance should address the problem.

Cohn, Jacob, Timothy A. Walton, Adam Lemon, and Toshi Yoshihara. *Leveling the Playing Field: Reintroducing U.S. Theater-Range Missiles in a Post-INF World*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019. <https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/leveling-the-playing-field-reintroducing-us-theater-range-missiles-in-a-post-INF-world>.

Cohn et al. argue that fielding conventional-armed, ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles holds substantial operational and strategic value to the United States and its allies. The introduction of such missiles would not be a major shift in U.S. military posture, but rather a logical, reciprocally competitive response to China and Russia developing similar technology. It is important for policymakers to begin to grapple with issues of funding, arsenal size, allied cooperation, and basing options so that the United States can begin to compete in the intermediate-range missile realm.

### **Panel 3: The Potential Costs and Risks of Different Courses of Action**

- What goals should guide competition? Over-match? Strategic dominance? Second to none? How much is enough?
- What new forms of regional instability might emerge with more intense offense/defense competition?
- Are there second-order effects of competition that should be anticipated?
- Do the answers depend on distinctions between different types?

Department of Defense. *2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report*. [https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD\\_INDO\\_PACIFIC\\_STRATEGY\\_REPORT\\_JUNE\\_2019.PDF](https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF)

This first Indo-Pacific Strategy Report articulates the DoD component within the Trump administration's strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. It identifies the Indo-Pacific as "the single most consequential region for America's future" and China as the primary challenger to the "free and open" regional order (pp. 8-10). It also details U.S. efforts to shore up its military posture in the region through preparedness, partnerships, and the promotion of a networked region.

Heim, Jacob. *Missiles for Asia? The Need for Operational Analysis of U.S. Theater Ballistic Missiles in the Pacific*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR945.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR945.html).

Heim urges the U.S. Army to consider the potential military value of conventional land-based theater ballistic missiles (TBMs). This was motivated at the time by uncertainty over the future of the INF Treaty following U.S. accusations of Russian violations. While Washington should not prematurely withdraw from the treaty, he argues that it should consider how to incorporate TBMs into its arsenal and strategies to prepare for the treaty's potential demise. Heim identifies benefits and potential strategic risks—e.g., financial and political costs as well as

challenges to reassuring adversaries—of developing and deploying TBM systems in the Western Pacific.

Vaddi, Pranay. “Leaving the INF Treaty Won’t Help Trump Counter China.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 31, 2019. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/31/leaving-inf-treaty-won-t-help-trump-counter-china-pub-78262>.

Vaddi, just before the United States and Russia formally withdrew from the INF Treaty in February 2019, challenges the arguments levied in favor of U.S. withdrawal. The pro-withdrawal arguments hinged mostly on the need to counter Chinese military growth by deploying conventional ground-based, intermediate-range missile systems (GBIRs). In his rebuttal, Vaddi argues that the Trump administration would likely face political-military obstacles, strategic risks, and political and financial costs, if it decided to pursue and deploy GBIRs. He concludes that the perceived benefits of countering China via withdrawal from the INF Treaty are outweighed by the risks.

White, Hugh. “US Could Ask Australia to Host Nuclear Missiles.” *The Strategist*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, January 17, 2019. <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/us-could-ask-australia-to-host-nuclear-missiles/>.

White invokes a question that the Australian government may soon have to consider: how should Canberra respond to a request from Washington to host nuclear-armed missiles? The article details how by prioritizing an effort to match the Chinese missile arsenal, the United States might want to place intermediate-range missiles of its own in the Western Pacific, possibly in Australia. Describing a new U.S.-Chinese cold war, White maintains that despite strategic reasons for placing intermediate-range missiles in Australia, the true U.S. motivation for such a move might be a demonstration of the United States as a reliable nuclear ally at a time when its credibility has come under scrutiny.

#### **Panel 4: Potential Reactions in the Region to Different U.S. & Allied Courses of Action**

- What reactions has China threatened, if any? What reactions can reasonably be anticipated?
- What reactions has Russia threatened, if any? What can be anticipated?
- What other regional actors might react in consequential ways? DPRK? Vietnam?

Wu, Riqiang. “China’s Calculus After the INF Treaty.” *East Asia Forum*, May 8, 2019. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/05/08/chinas-calculus-after-the-inf-treaty/>.

Wu examines the Chinese perception of security and how this may change amidst new U.S. missile deployments following withdrawal from the INF Treaty. Citing the already existing quantitative disparity of nuclear warheads between China and the United States, he argues that U.S. deployment of nuclear cruise missiles

into the Western Pacific would have little impact on strategic stability. Nevertheless, it would be seen as an aggressive act and likely face vocal opposition. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles could be a different story. Capable of striking drastically faster, they would pose a threat to Chinese nuclear assets like road-mobile launchers.

Stokes, Jacob, and Alec C. Blivas. *China's Missile Program and U.S. Withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty*. Washington, D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2019. <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20and%20INF%20.pdf>.

Stokes and Blivas challenge the argument that the United States' post-INF deployments might be inconsequential. They argue that the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty will indeed have implications on the military balance in Asia, regional stability, and the United States' ability to deter China. In response to a U.S. withdrawal, China could seek to punish those U.S.-regional allies hosting new the missiles.

The Kremlin. "Working Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu." February 2, 2019. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59763>.

This official transcript details a conversation between Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu regarding the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty. Lavrov outlines the long history of supposed U.S. violations and transgressions which had undermined arms control despite Russian attempts to quell them. Shoigu provides the Defense Ministry's assessment of the situation: The United States "has been [violating] the INF, and this has been going on for several years." He makes two proposals: beginning research and development of land-based modifications to the sea-based Kalibr launchers and to engineer land-based launchers for hypersonic intermediate-range missiles.

Fitzsimmons, Michael. "Russian Strategy and the End of the INF Treaty." *Survival* 60, no. 6 (2018): 119-36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1542802>.

Fitzsimmons provides five explanations for why Russia may have decided to violate the INF Treaty, including the desire to achieve conventional military advantage in Europe or Asia, to attempt to sow division within NATO, and to achieve strategic deterrence. The latter offers a basis for which an understanding of Russia's motivation for ultimately ending the INF Treaty may stem. Warning against letting the treaty's failure precipitate negative consequences for NATO and European security, he urges the United States to proceed with resolve towards extending the New Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (New START). He concludes that the weapons Russia may deploy in the post-INF environment are not likely to fundamentally alter the European operational military balance.



Charap, Samuel. "The Demise of the INF: Implications for Russia-China Relations." Statement for the Record for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 9, 2019. [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT507/RAND\\_CT507.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT507/RAND_CT507.pdf).

In this testimony, Charap examines China's view of the INF Treaty, Sino-Russian relations, and the broader implications of the demise of the treaty. He argues that the Chinese reaction will depend primarily on U.S. and Russian choices concerning the deployment of intermediate-range missiles. If Washington were the first to deploy new missiles in the Western Pacific, China would likely not feel threatened by Russia reciprocating. Yet, some Chinese commentators have criticized Russia's role in the demise of the INF Treaty. A U.S.-Russian agreement to not deploy new missiles in Europe (but leave out Asia) would likely raise concerns in China. In turn, a Chinese missile buildup precipitated by new U.S. missiles could strain Sino-Russian relations.

Mohan, C. Raja. "Raja Mandala: India, China, and the INF Treaty." *The Indian Express*, October 30, 2018. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-china-and-the-inf-treaty-5424298/>.

Mohan argues that with the INF Treaty terminated, India will be in a tough spot; it has less of an arms-control problem than it does with navigating the future of Indian-Russian collaboration on hypersonic missile development, which is sure to draw international criticism. An emerging U.S.-Chinese missile arms race might also impact India's security.

### **Panel 5: The Future of "Dual Track"**

- Should there be a dual-track approach if and as the United States seeks to deploy missiles into the region? If so, what would it encompass?
- What if the dual-track approach in Europe proves partially or fully successful? What implications would that have in Asia?

Maurer, John D. "The Dual-Track Approach: A Long-Term Strategy for a Post-INF Treaty World." *War on the Rocks*, April 10, 2019. <https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-dual-track-approach-a-long-term-strategy-for-a-post-inf-treaty-world/>.

Maurer contends that if the United States wants to bring Russia and China to the table to negotiate an INF-like treaty, it should employ the dual-track approach NATO used in the 1980s. He asserts that in a post-INF world, the United States would have a considerable advantage over its adversaries because of its vast network of allies. With a dual-track strategy the United States could leverage this network and missile deployments and bring Russia and China into a new agreement.

Tosaki, Hirofumi, Miho Okada, and Hironori Fushita. "US Told Russia it is Leaving INF Treaty: Possible Impacts on the Asia-Pacific Security." *JIIA Strategic Comments no. 1*, Japan Institute of International Affairs, October 10, 2018. [http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/article\\_page.php?id=9](http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/article_page.php?id=9).

Tosaki, Okada, and Fushita propose that if a dual-track strategy is implemented by the United States in the Northeast Asia context, Japan may play a key role. Japan would likely be asked to house U.S. land-based, short- and intermediate-range missiles—something they contend will dramatically increase tensions with China. They look back to the original INF Treaty's formation process and examine Japan's contribution. Japan was crucial in ensuring that land-based SRBMs and IRBMs were not just removed from the European theater, leading to the inclusion of a "zero-option" clause in the final agreement. In today's environment, they implore that Japan take an equally active role in potential negotiations. They emphasize that an arms-control agreement between China and the United States is crucial for improving regional stability.

Tosaki, Hirofumi. "Nuclear Arms Control in a Post-INF Treaty Period: A Chance to Engage China?" *JIIA Strategic Comments no. 9*, Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 19, 2019. [http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/article\\_page.php?id=18](http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/article_page.php?id=18).

Tosaki examines regional stake holders in the East Asia and how power dynamics may shift following the expected end of the INF Treaty in August 2019. Tosaki examines different pathways to engage China, though he is skeptical that a new INF-like agreement could be reached between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. His most prominent suggestion for mitigating regional tensions includes establishing transparent arsenal declarations throughout Northeast Asia, with disclosures accounting for components such as the number of delivery systems and their ranges, stockpiled warheads, and each state's accompanying doctrines. This, in Tosaki's opinion, could improve stability by alleviating suspicion and confusion over others' intentions in the region.

Thomas, Jim. "Statement Before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces on the Future of the INF Treaty." U.S House of Representatives, July 17, 2014. <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20140717/102474/HHRG-113-AS29-Wstate-ThomasJ-20140717-U1.pdf>.

Thomas explains that if the United States wanted to implement a multilateral INF Treaty, pursuing a dual-track strategy may provide the only motivation for other states to consider doing so; especially with countries like China, who depend heavily on their missile forces for deterrence. To accomplish a renewed INF-like regime, he instructs the United States to work with its allies to pressure countries like Russia and China through applying dual-track strategies. Allies could do so by emphasizing the dangers of uncontrolled SRBMs and IRBMs, while simultaneously signaling their willingness to host U.S. missiles if an agreement cannot be reached.

## Panel 6: Alternative Courses of Action for the United States and Its Allies

- What are the main alternative courses of military and political action?
- What are their separate benefits, costs, and risks?
- In answering these questions, are there salient differences of view between the United States and its allies?

Cuomo, Scott A. "It's Time to Make a New Deal: Solving the INF Treaty's Strategic Liabilities to Achieve U.S. Security Goals in Asia." *Texas National Security Review* 2, no. 1 (2018): 104-29. <https://tnsr.org/2018/11/its-time-to-make-a-new-deal-solving-the-inf-treatys-strategic-liabilities-to-achieve-u-s-security-goals-in-asia/>.

Cuomo explores four alternative pathways to counter China's superiority in ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles and achieve U.S. security goals in Asia: 1) leaning more heavily on U.S. nuclear capabilities to deter Chinese aggression; 2) investing in sea- and air-based missile platforms to regain conventional superiority; 3) looking to emerging technologies, such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled lethal autonomous weapons systems, as possible alternative solutions; and 4) seeking to renegotiate the INF Treaty or, failing that, exercising its right to withdraw from the treaty in order to field ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles. While Chinese accession to an updated INF Treaty would be the preferred outcome, this is also unlikely. Cuomo therefore argues that the United States should work with regional allies and partners to field conventional intermediate-range missiles and focus future investments on AI-enabled lethal autonomous weapons systems.

Kearn, David W. "The Future of US Deterrence in East Asia: Are Conventional Land-Based IRBMs a Silver Bullet?" *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (2013): 93-116. [https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-07\\_Issue-4/2013winter-Kearn.pdf](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-07_Issue-4/2013winter-Kearn.pdf).

After considering the obstacles to and security implications of deploying U.S. IRBM in the Western Pacific, Kearn outlines several approaches to enhance offensive capabilities and thus reinforce deterrence in a more cost-effective and operationally flexible way without requiring withdrawal from the INF Treaty. In the short term, the United States should rely on SSGNs and conventional air-launched stand-off capabilities. In the medium term, "arsenal ships" and "arsenal airplanes" could expand U.S. capabilities and complicate Chinese planning. Finally, in the long term, Kearn argues, long-range strike platforms and loitering munitions could provide decisive advantages. Additionally, the United States should work to improve allies' A2/AD capabilities.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. *Archipelagic Defense: The Japan-U.S. Alliance and Preserving Peace and Stability in the Western Pacific*. The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2017. [https://www.spf.org/jpus-i/img/investigation/SPF\\_20170810\\_03.pdf](https://www.spf.org/jpus-i/img/investigation/SPF_20170810_03.pdf).

Krepinevich calls on the United States and Japan and their regional allies and partners to engage in "Archipelagic Defense" in order to deter Chinese aggression and coercion. This strategy would entail an effort to maintain a favorable military balance in the near term

and developing new sources of comparative advantage over the longer term. In addition to enhancing U.S. and allied military capabilities, Krepinevich also emphasizes the procedural importance of joint strategy development and implementation, particularly with respect to gaining a common understanding of the challenge China poses, assessing the mobilization balance in the region and opportunities for economic warfare, and creating a strong strategic narrative to address the social dimension of strategy.

Cooper, David A. "Globalizing Reagan's INF Treaty." *The Nonproliferation Review* 20, no. 1 (2013): 145-163. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/10736700.2013.769373>.

Cooper reviews the history of attempts to multilateralize/globalize the INF Treaty and suggested (in 2013) that the Obama administration should consider initiating discussions toward that end. He argues that a joint U.S.-Russian declaration that the treaty is open for others to join on a "take it or leave it basis" could produce tangible, albeit initially modest, security benefits at little risk. The ultimate goal would be to, over time, establish a new nonproliferation norm pertaining to intermediate-range missiles themselves, and of theirs as a technological steppingstone toward intercontinental-range missiles.

Bell, Alexandra. "We Don't Have a Missile Gap in Asia. We Have a Diplomacy Gap." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 2, 2018. <https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/we-dont-have-a-missile-gap-in-asia-we-have-a-diplomacy-gap/>.

Kulacki, Gregory. "Don't Scapegoat China for Killing the INF Treaty. Ask it to Join." *All Things Nuclear*, Union of Concerned Scientists, February 6, 2019. <https://allthingsnuclear.org/gkulacki/dont-scapegoat-china-for-killing-the-inf-treaty-ask-it-to-join>.

Bell and Kulacki both lament a lack of diplomatic effort regarding the implications of the demise of the INF Treaty for Indo-Pacific security. They argue that withdrawal from the treaty and deployment of U.S. IRBM in the region alone will not solve the challenge presented by China. While Bell emphasizes the importance of having a strong and empowered team of diplomats work the issue, so that confidence-building measures might eventually transform into negotiations over limitations, as they did between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s, Kulacki looks at potential Chinese demands for joining a globalized INF Treaty. These include the forum in which negotiations might take place (i.e., the UNCD), the broadening of the agenda beyond the INF Treaty (i.e., to include the militarization of space), and asymmetric limitations (i.e., what is the United States willing to give up of China relinquishing its IRBM?).

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